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GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM BRENDAN BURKE

by Brendan Burke
“This is an administration that will not talk
about how we gather intelligence, how we
know what we’re going to do, nor what our
plans are. When we move, we will communicate with you in an appropriate manner.”
“Americans should not expect one battle, but
a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have
ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes,
visible on TV, and covert operations, secret
even in success.”
—President Bush at the outset of the war
Like most Americans under forty, I have little experience with America at war. Short engagements like
“Desert Storm,” Grenada, and Panama hardly qualify;
they were over almost as soon as they began. Now,
we’re faced with the real thing, the war on terrorism.
But as President Bush warned us, this is a war fraught
with confusion. What are we to make of this war, when
even the successes are secret and the failures are rich
fodder for a media starved for some form of coverage?
How do we balance hidden positive outcomes with
media overkill pertaining to governmental mistakes?
First, it is important to remember that there have been
some clear successes, at the outset in Afghanistan and
on the domestic front (probable terrorists captured in
Buffalo and Portland, Oregon for example). Second, it is
useful to consider success not only from specific threats
or incidents averted, or in contrast, to judge the fight
on terrorism as a failure when the terrorists pull off specific attacks. Our approach to considering this war
needs to involve a longer view, a pattern of effort over
the years. As citizens outside of the military or public
safety realm, we need to assess whether our governmental leaders appear to be learning over time about
better ways to handle the threat of terrorism. There are
some encouraging signs, based on recent history, that
the government is retooling its organizational capacity
in responsive and effective ways to deal with the terrorism threat. This essay discusses two recent failed military and public safety efforts, which have been
followed with encouraging reorganizations and reforms
that have laid the groundwork for a successful war on
terrorism.

BLACK HAWK DOWN,
AND LESSONS LEARNED IN WAR
The movie Black Hawk Down, based on the book by
journalist Mark Bowden, displays in heartbreaking
fashion some of the worst of American diplomacy, military decision-making, and tactical choices in modern
times. In October 1993, the United States was involved
in a conflict with Mohammed Farrah Aidid, a Somali
warlord who controlled a portion of his country with a
brutal hand. The Battle of Mogadishu was intended as a
rapid insertion of Airborne Rangers and Special Forces
troops to kidnap two of Aidid’s lieutenants. Soldiers
would be dropped in from helicopters, take their prisoners, and be removed from the hostile city center by a
Ranger ground unit in trucks and Humvees. But the
American forces were taken off guard by the hatred and
fervor of the locals. The American troops thought their
enemy was a narrow group of Aidid’s close supporters,
where in fact, many citizens of Mogadishu joined in the
fight against the Rangers. Two Black Hawk helicopters
were shot down with surface-to-air missiles, and the
raid on Aidid’s leadership team turned into a recovery
effort of Ranger units and helicopter crews, stranded in
the narrow streets of the ancient city.
The movie focuses on the struggle of these elite American military forces to survive in the streets. In the end,
over one hundred American troops were wounded, and
nineteen died, while over a thousand Somalis lost their
lives. Bowden’s book covers the environment of this
conflict in rich detail, and describes some of the reasons
for this catastrophe. This battle was fought with the
wrong forces for the task; with a misunderstanding of
how they were perceived in the community where they
fought; and with problematic coordination and technical support.
The American forces in the Battle of Mogadishu included two of the best tools in our arsenal. The core of the
strike force was a unit of Airborne Rangers, an elite,
select group of soldiers who are well-trained and wellequipped for rapid strikes. In Mogadishu, the Rangers
operated from helicopters based at the city’s airport,
with the ability to move quickly to all points in the city
where they were needed. The American effort also
included a handful of Special Forces troops. These are
the most elite of all American soldiers.
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Why couldn’t these superior American troops prevail
against a band of apparently disorganized Somali
youths? Bowden builds a case that it was the very elite
nature of the American presence that inspired a highly
emotional hatred of the invading forces. The American
troops were unaware of the negative symbolism that
they portrayed. When Kevlar-clad warriors swooped
overhead in well-armed helicopters, Aidid’s soldiers
could criticize them as the real aggressors. Bowden tells
of how the helicopters would kick up frustrating dust
storms throughout the sandy streets of Mogadishu, and
even pull the corrugated metal roofs off of slum
dwellings with the backdraft of their propellers. Aidid’s
forces may have been autocratic and violent toward
Mogadishu’s citizens, but the warlord’s troops could
claim that at least they weren’t imperialist invaders
bent on destroying neighborhoods and homes. Once the
battle began, the hatred for Americans proved to be a
significant rallying device for Aidid’s lieutenants.
American soldiers found themselves in a fight not
against a handful of well-armed Aidid regulars, but
instead greatly outnumbered by a vast mob of street
fighters of varying capability.
The book and movie describe one other tragic component of the Battle of Mogadishu, involving battlefield
coordination. American troops on the ground operated
with “eyes in the sky” officers in a helicopter and even
higher, in a Navy spy plane. The idea is that the spy
plane can see the entire battlefield, the road grid, and
opposing forces spread throughout the streets. When
the first of two Black Hawk helicopters was shot down
in the middle of the city, Rangers on the ground quickly
organized a rescue party. Mogadishu’s streets are
unpaved, narrow, and have no signage and few recognizable landmarks. In theory, the Navy plane should be
able to direct the rescue unit’s Humvees across the city
to the downed helicopter, even in a manner that avoids
certain neighborhoods where Aidid’s forces may have
blocked streets to create ambush situations.
In practice, this coordinating system failed tragically.
The core of the problem was that the spy plane’s directions were relayed to the Humvees on the ground
through the intervening command helicopter. This created a time delay, which confounded instructions to the
lead vehicle on the ground. In the spy plane, the navigator saw that the rescue convoy should take a left turn at
the third intersection. He passed this direction on to the
helicopter, but by then the lead Humvee had driven
past the first intersection. As a result the convoy of
Humvees took several wrong turns, into blind alleys
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and ambushes. At one point, the convoy was only six
blocks along main roads from one of the downed helicopters, but the misdirection sent the convoy through
fifty-five blocks of back roads in the city, with time
wasting away for the downed helicopter crew. The convoy was under steady fire from roof tops and side
streets during this time. Eventually, the rescue force
was so depleted through injuries that their mission was
called off.
Fast forward to 2001, and the War in Afghanistan:
America’s military preparations show that we learned
sufficiently well to avoid the mistakes of Mogadishu.
First, the United States and its allies fought the Taliban
while using a concept called “steering, not rowing.” The
broad idea is that government workers need not, and
maybe should not, be the ones to carry out governmental goals. We see this increasingly in the delivery of
domestic governmental services, such as in the use of
non-profit agencies to deliver state-ordered welfare programs. In the context of war in Afghanistan, the
Rangers and Special Forces have had a much reduced,
but more focused and productive role. One of the core
competencies of the Special Forces is to train indigenous
military forces in weapons use, tactics, and in the moral
and ethical use of both while in the war zone.
Instead of engaging in battle (“rowing”), Special Forces
soldiers trained Northern Alliance units (“steering”) in
what were clearly quite productive techniques to win
the early phase of the war.
Why was this a superior strategy in 2001? After the
September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden called upon
Arab nations to join together in fighting against
America—much the same way that Aidid had called
upon Somalis to ignore his own atrocities, and focus on
outside threats from America. If the war in Afghanistan
had been fought predominantly with American soldiers, Al-Qaeda would have had a powerful recruiting
tool, to create local opposition to the anti-terrorist
effort. Clearly, this strategy allowed the war to proceed
more smoothly from the outset; the potential for opposition to coalesce against an “outside threat” was
reduced, since the Taliban were engaged in a battle predominantly against other Afghanis from the Northern
Alliance.
This is certainly not the whole story. The fight against
the Taliban continues. The stability of the new government under President Hamid Karzai is tenuous, and
there are still varied criticisms about the moral and ethical ways of the new government. But the main message
remains: The United States made a better start in this
fight as a result of difficult lessons learned in Somalia.

DECEMBER 2002

7

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM BRENDAN BURKE

by Brendan Burke
“This is an administration that will not talk
about how we gather intelligence, how we
know what we’re going to do, nor what our
plans are. When we move, we will communicate with you in an appropriate manner.”
“Americans should not expect one battle, but
a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have
ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes,
visible on TV, and covert operations, secret
even in success.”
—President Bush at the outset of the war
Like most Americans under forty, I have little experience with America at war. Short engagements like
“Desert Storm,” Grenada, and Panama hardly qualify;
they were over almost as soon as they began. Now,
we’re faced with the real thing, the war on terrorism.
But as President Bush warned us, this is a war fraught
with confusion. What are we to make of this war, when
even the successes are secret and the failures are rich
fodder for a media starved for some form of coverage?
How do we balance hidden positive outcomes with
media overkill pertaining to governmental mistakes?
First, it is important to remember that there have been
some clear successes, at the outset in Afghanistan and
on the domestic front (probable terrorists captured in
Buffalo and Portland, Oregon for example). Second, it is
useful to consider success not only from specific threats
or incidents averted, or in contrast, to judge the fight
on terrorism as a failure when the terrorists pull off specific attacks. Our approach to considering this war
needs to involve a longer view, a pattern of effort over
the years. As citizens outside of the military or public
safety realm, we need to assess whether our governmental leaders appear to be learning over time about
better ways to handle the threat of terrorism. There are
some encouraging signs, based on recent history, that
the government is retooling its organizational capacity
in responsive and effective ways to deal with the terrorism threat. This essay discusses two recent failed military and public safety efforts, which have been
followed with encouraging reorganizations and reforms
that have laid the groundwork for a successful war on
terrorism.

BLACK HAWK DOWN,
AND LESSONS LEARNED IN WAR
The movie Black Hawk Down, based on the book by
journalist Mark Bowden, displays in heartbreaking
fashion some of the worst of American diplomacy, military decision-making, and tactical choices in modern
times. In October 1993, the United States was involved
in a conflict with Mohammed Farrah Aidid, a Somali
warlord who controlled a portion of his country with a
brutal hand. The Battle of Mogadishu was intended as a
rapid insertion of Airborne Rangers and Special Forces
troops to kidnap two of Aidid’s lieutenants. Soldiers
would be dropped in from helicopters, take their prisoners, and be removed from the hostile city center by a
Ranger ground unit in trucks and Humvees. But the
American forces were taken off guard by the hatred and
fervor of the locals. The American troops thought their
enemy was a narrow group of Aidid’s close supporters,
where in fact, many citizens of Mogadishu joined in the
fight against the Rangers. Two Black Hawk helicopters
were shot down with surface-to-air missiles, and the
raid on Aidid’s leadership team turned into a recovery
effort of Ranger units and helicopter crews, stranded in
the narrow streets of the ancient city.
The movie focuses on the struggle of these elite American military forces to survive in the streets. In the end,
over one hundred American troops were wounded, and
nineteen died, while over a thousand Somalis lost their
lives. Bowden’s book covers the environment of this
conflict in rich detail, and describes some of the reasons
for this catastrophe. This battle was fought with the
wrong forces for the task; with a misunderstanding of
how they were perceived in the community where they
fought; and with problematic coordination and technical support.
The American forces in the Battle of Mogadishu included two of the best tools in our arsenal. The core of the
strike force was a unit of Airborne Rangers, an elite,
select group of soldiers who are well-trained and wellequipped for rapid strikes. In Mogadishu, the Rangers
operated from helicopters based at the city’s airport,
with the ability to move quickly to all points in the city
where they were needed. The American effort also
included a handful of Special Forces troops. These are
the most elite of all American soldiers.

Photograph by Greg Thomas

Government Reorganization
in the Fight
Against Terrorism

Why couldn’t these superior American troops prevail
against a band of apparently disorganized Somali
youths? Bowden builds a case that it was the very elite
nature of the American presence that inspired a highly
emotional hatred of the invading forces. The American
troops were unaware of the negative symbolism that
they portrayed. When Kevlar-clad warriors swooped
overhead in well-armed helicopters, Aidid’s soldiers
could criticize them as the real aggressors. Bowden tells
of how the helicopters would kick up frustrating dust
storms throughout the sandy streets of Mogadishu, and
even pull the corrugated metal roofs off of slum
dwellings with the backdraft of their propellers. Aidid’s
forces may have been autocratic and violent toward
Mogadishu’s citizens, but the warlord’s troops could
claim that at least they weren’t imperialist invaders
bent on destroying neighborhoods and homes. Once the
battle began, the hatred for Americans proved to be a
significant rallying device for Aidid’s lieutenants.
American soldiers found themselves in a fight not
against a handful of well-armed Aidid regulars, but
instead greatly outnumbered by a vast mob of street
fighters of varying capability.
The book and movie describe one other tragic component of the Battle of Mogadishu, involving battlefield
coordination. American troops on the ground operated
with “eyes in the sky” officers in a helicopter and even
higher, in a Navy spy plane. The idea is that the spy
plane can see the entire battlefield, the road grid, and
opposing forces spread throughout the streets. When
the first of two Black Hawk helicopters was shot down
in the middle of the city, Rangers on the ground quickly
organized a rescue party. Mogadishu’s streets are
unpaved, narrow, and have no signage and few recognizable landmarks. In theory, the Navy plane should be
able to direct the rescue unit’s Humvees across the city
to the downed helicopter, even in a manner that avoids
certain neighborhoods where Aidid’s forces may have
blocked streets to create ambush situations.
In practice, this coordinating system failed tragically.
The core of the problem was that the spy plane’s directions were relayed to the Humvees on the ground
through the intervening command helicopter. This created a time delay, which confounded instructions to the
lead vehicle on the ground. In the spy plane, the navigator saw that the rescue convoy should take a left turn at
the third intersection. He passed this direction on to the
helicopter, but by then the lead Humvee had driven
past the first intersection. As a result the convoy of
Humvees took several wrong turns, into blind alleys

BRIDGEWATER REVIEW

and ambushes. At one point, the convoy was only six
blocks along main roads from one of the downed helicopters, but the misdirection sent the convoy through
fifty-five blocks of back roads in the city, with time
wasting away for the downed helicopter crew. The convoy was under steady fire from roof tops and side
streets during this time. Eventually, the rescue force
was so depleted through injuries that their mission was
called off.
Fast forward to 2001, and the War in Afghanistan:
America’s military preparations show that we learned
sufficiently well to avoid the mistakes of Mogadishu.
First, the United States and its allies fought the Taliban
while using a concept called “steering, not rowing.” The
broad idea is that government workers need not, and
maybe should not, be the ones to carry out governmental goals. We see this increasingly in the delivery of
domestic governmental services, such as in the use of
non-profit agencies to deliver state-ordered welfare programs. In the context of war in Afghanistan, the
Rangers and Special Forces have had a much reduced,
but more focused and productive role. One of the core
competencies of the Special Forces is to train indigenous
military forces in weapons use, tactics, and in the moral
and ethical use of both while in the war zone.
Instead of engaging in battle (“rowing”), Special Forces
soldiers trained Northern Alliance units (“steering”) in
what were clearly quite productive techniques to win
the early phase of the war.
Why was this a superior strategy in 2001? After the
September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden called upon
Arab nations to join together in fighting against
America—much the same way that Aidid had called
upon Somalis to ignore his own atrocities, and focus on
outside threats from America. If the war in Afghanistan
had been fought predominantly with American soldiers, Al-Qaeda would have had a powerful recruiting
tool, to create local opposition to the anti-terrorist
effort. Clearly, this strategy allowed the war to proceed
more smoothly from the outset; the potential for opposition to coalesce against an “outside threat” was
reduced, since the Taliban were engaged in a battle predominantly against other Afghanis from the Northern
Alliance.
This is certainly not the whole story. The fight against
the Taliban continues. The stability of the new government under President Hamid Karzai is tenuous, and
there are still varied criticisms about the moral and ethical ways of the new government. But the main message
remains: The United States made a better start in this
fight as a result of difficult lessons learned in Somalia.

DECEMBER 2002

7

See Table 1 for a full summary of the organizational
improvements made between the engagements in
Somalia and Afghanistan.
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TRAFFIC AND DOMESTIC LESSONS LEARNED
During the summer of 2002, we were shown the plans
for “the most extensive reorganization of the federal
government since the 1940s.” President Bush announced a huge realignment of most of our domestic security
apparatus, involving approximately 170,000 Federal
government employees from agencies as diverse as the
Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management
Administration, and the National Institutes of Health.
This mammoth bureaucracy would be called the
Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, no government program so large had been intended for implementation on such a tight time frame since World
War II.
Up to this point, coordination of domestic effort in the
war on terrorism had been in the hands of the White
House Office of Homeland Security. Its director, Tom
Ridge, had resigned as Governor of Pennsylvania in the
days after the September 11 attacks, and had worked in
conjunction with Attorney General John Ashcroft to
plan and set policy for the fight against terrorists. Ridge
is the identified leader of these efforts, and was thus
called the homeland security “czar.” The Department of
Homeland Security proposal was initially well received
by both Republicans and Democrats in Congress, but
met with delays and opposition to its specifics. The key
question in Congress surrounding the Department of
Homeland Security: Is it better to have a coordinator of
the anti-terror effort in many agencies, or a monolithic
department, including almost ten percent of the Federal
workforce within its boundaries? Eventually Congress
and the President reached a series of compromises and
passed legislation establishing the Department of
Homeland Security.
Modern organization theory tends to point us toward
solutions that are more flexible and responsive to
changing demands in the operating environment. A
common form is the “matrix,” which involves the
establishment of leadership and planning networks
both by functional area (such as public health threats)
as well as by site (such as in the New England region).
When a specific functional area rises in importance,
that network becomes the focus of overall effort.
Advocates of matrix management contend that the old
hierarchy is outdated and hard to reorient in a crisis.
They can point to the greater responsiveness of a more
fluid, pragmatic military strategy in Afghanistan as part
of their supporting evidence.

But on the other hand, a case can be made that consolidation of many units has a better chance for success.
First, the current domestic security structure is convoluted, and appears to be impossible to manage. The
Homeland Security Department established an array of
agencies with a role in the domestic war on terrorism.
The organization chart shows twenty-two
cabinet or department level organizations, and 119
functional agencies as playing a part in this fight. This
chart despite its expansiveness ignores two other complex circumstances: Each cabinet-level agency is aligned
with at least one Congressional committee to help in
setting policy; and many of the 119 functional areas are
further supported by state and local units and agencies.
In many instances, it is not the entire agency (such as
the Department of Interior) which would fight terrorism, but a much smaller police unit within. This deepening of the organization complexity raises numerous
questions and political problems. Would the Interior
Secretary, for example, easily concede to a Department
of Homeland Security request to free up these police
forces to fight terrorism, as opposed to some other part
of Interior’s mission?
Second, the coordination of many agencies has already
been tried, and has met with more failure than success.
The best comparable example of matrix management at
the Federal level has been in the war on drugs, where
the White House Office of Drug Control Policy operates
under a “czar,” a coordinator of far-flung agencies with a
stake in controlling the importation and use of illegal
drugs. We can look to some of what occurred in the
movie Traffic to see the failure of a “czar” to coordinate a
widespread effort with multiple and competing policy
goals. Traffic is the story of the war on drugs; similar to
Black Hawk Down, it is based on documentary evidence,
but with a few more liberties to make the story interesting. Traffic is a rich, textured movie, with an ironic plot
line about a committed drug “czar” with a horribly
crack-addicted daughter, and a compelling contrast
between “street-level’ drug enforcement officers in San
Diego and Mexico.
The drug “czar” and the Secretary of Homeland
Security sound like powerful positions, but their actions
are constrained by the complexity of the issue and the
variety of the participants in the policy area. Chances
are, the office holder won’t outlast the problems. In
reality, Governor Ridge shares his authority, especially
with the Attorney General. The coordinating function
can be overstated, whenever separate agencies, with different missions and legislative sponsors, disagree.
In the movie, Judge Calloway “manages by walking
around” traveling to the agencies and places that matter
in his job as the “czar.” He only hears of the difficulties,
no successes, in the War on Drugs. A supervisor at a bor-

der checkpoint in San Diego says
that he’d like to be able to attest
that they’re catching forty or fifty
percent of the drugs that “mules”
try to smuggle into California, but
in reality, he estimates that seventy percent of the drugs get
through. While on an airplane
back from San Diego, with representatives from the FBI, DEA, and
other agencies, Calloway tries to
initiate a brainstorming session—
but nobody has any new ideas.
Even worse, each agency leader is
afraid to reveal any ideas in front
of the other agencies that compete for limited budgetary
resources.

Table 1
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE BATTLE OF
MOGADISHU AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
Organizational Aspect

Mogadishu

Afghanistan

U.S. Rangers most
prominent, but with some
Special Forces
soldiers involved

Some U.S. Special Forces,
mostly in a training and support
capacity, with local Afghani
militias most prominent
(e.g., Northern Alliance)

U.S. intervention,
with use of a few paid
local informants

U.S assistance, support, and
coordination of sympathetic
local Afghani militias

“Rowing”

“Steering”

Public Relations
Consequences

The U.S. seen as intruder
and aggressor

The U.S. seen as supportive
of local autonomy

Cooperation within
U.S.Military Forces

Lacking; U.S. Rangers and
Special Forces were rivals,
competing rather than
cooperating toward goals

Enhanced, as the merits
of conventional and nonconventional forces are
recognized

Battlefield Coordination

Leadership uses traditional
top-down, command and
control, from the air and
remote posts; “Eyes in
the Sky” orders
confounded as they
reach soldiers

Leadership allows a more fluid,
pragmatic, and empowered
responsiveness at the centers
of action; relays of information
are also reduced, through the
use of enhanced technology

Lead Military Forces
Used on the Ground

Policy Focus

Metaphor for War Effort

The War on Terrorism is different.
It is encouraging that in organizing for this war, we likely won’t
make the same mistake of having
a White House “Coordinator” in
charge of the effort. Here’s one
argument in support of the consolidation of all, or at best most,
resources to fight terrorism.

Organization of the Department of Homeland Security
Secretary*
Deputy Secretary

Secret Service

Border and Transportation
Security

Emergency Preparedness
and Response

State, Local, and Private
Sector Coordination

Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures

Preparedness

Border Security

Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection

Infrastructure Protection

Transportation Security

Mitigation

Science & Technology
Development

Coast Guard

Response

Chemical

Immigration Services

Recovery

Biological / Agricultural

Physical Assets

Telecommunications
and Cybersecurity

Threat Analysis
Radiological / Nuclear

Visa Processing

Management

Human Capital

Information
Technology

Finance

Procurement
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*Legal / Congressional / Public Affairs
included in Office of the Secretary
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(e.g., Northern Alliance)

U.S. intervention,
with use of a few paid
local informants

U.S assistance, support, and
coordination of sympathetic
local Afghani militias

“Rowing”

“Steering”

Public Relations
Consequences

The U.S. seen as intruder
and aggressor

The U.S. seen as supportive
of local autonomy

Cooperation within
U.S.Military Forces

Lacking; U.S. Rangers and
Special Forces were rivals,
competing rather than
cooperating toward goals

Enhanced, as the merits
of conventional and nonconventional forces are
recognized

Battlefield Coordination

Leadership uses traditional
top-down, command and
control, from the air and
remote posts; “Eyes in
the Sky” orders
confounded as they
reach soldiers

Leadership allows a more fluid,
pragmatic, and empowered
responsiveness at the centers
of action; relays of information
are also reduced, through the
use of enhanced technology

Lead Military Forces
Used on the Ground

Policy Focus

Metaphor for War Effort

The War on Terrorism is different.
It is encouraging that in organizing for this war, we likely won’t
make the same mistake of having
a White House “Coordinator” in
charge of the effort. Here’s one
argument in support of the consolidation of all, or at best most,
resources to fight terrorism.

Organization of the Department of Homeland Security
Secretary*
Deputy Secretary

Secret Service

Border and Transportation
Security

Emergency Preparedness
and Response

State, Local, and Private
Sector Coordination

Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures

Preparedness

Border Security

Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection

Infrastructure Protection

Transportation Security

Mitigation

Science & Technology
Development

Coast Guard

Response

Chemical

Immigration Services

Recovery

Biological / Agricultural

Physical Assets

Telecommunications
and Cybersecurity

Threat Analysis
Radiological / Nuclear

Visa Processing

Management

Human Capital

Information
Technology

Finance

Procurement

BRIDGEWATER REVIEW

*Legal / Congressional / Public Affairs
included in Office of the Secretary
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Table 2

Teaching Information Literacy

Photograph by David Wilson

CONTRASTS IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BETWEEN THE WAR ON
Ashton Carter, the
DRUGS AND PROPOSED FOR THE DOMESTIC WAR ON TERRORISM
Coordinator of the
Preventive Defense
Organizational Aspect
War on Drugs
Domestic War on Terrorism
Project at Harvard,
Programmatic Wide; many agencies have a Wider; terrorism is an even more
points out the diffiRepresentation stake in this fight
varied and widespread threat than
culty of specifying
drug violence, sales and use
our goals in this war.
Coordination of Effort Limited; agencies remain inStrong, at least in theory; all
He asks, Is fighting
dependent but are organized as agencies and programs serve
terrorism to be conmembers of a “team”
the same chief
sidered in the same
Description of Matrix, with the ability to
Hierarchy, with all resources and
vein as conventional
Organizational Structure treat regional problems or func- agencies operating under the orders
war? Not exactly;
tional problems, under
of the Secretary of Homeland
we do not work
the guidance of a “czar”
Defense
against nations,
Agency Autonomy Maintained relatively intact;
Significantly reduced; the mission of
through treaties,
only in certain situations and agencies and programs within the
with identified comunder specific circumstances Department is made more narrow
does an agency’s broad
and focused
batants. Is fighting
mission need to focus on
terrorism like fighting
the shared problem
crime? Again, this is
Structural Advantage The matrix is well equipped
The hierarchical agency should
not a good match;
to respond to a changing exter- be able to reduce internal dissent
there is much more to
nal environment, in
among separate agencies and
this fight than findtheory, as long as the “czar”
programs, as long as the resources
has real coordinating power
are not too diverse
ing perpetrators and
and diffuse
bringing them into
the criminal justice
system. The war
ahead may be closest to disaster response and recovery;
Is Tom Ridge’s comment reassuring, or discouraging?
that was the most important part of reestablishing
Some may be frightened that even he doesn’t know the
New York after the World Trade Center attacks, but we
answers. I see it differently: Ridge cannot predict the
wouldn’t want to stop there. The fact is, the war
future, and we should respect his honesty in this regard.
against terrorism falls into all three policy areas. But all
Further, we should be pleased that the government is
three focuses have distinct political and bureaucratic
trying different options, even ones that buck current
cultures. The intent of the Department of Homeland
trends and philosophy on organizational improvement.
Security is to give a high degree of command and conThis essay does not predict success or failure in the
trol when the policy focus needs to change, from crime
war on terrorism, but it does point toward the strong
prevention to disaster recovery to emergency preparedpotential that our governmental leadership and organiness. This wouldn’t be possible under a system where
zations are learning from the recent past. The fighting
all of the terror-fighting agencies were able to retain
in Afghanistan was dramatically different from the suctheir own identity. See Table 2 for a summary of the
cessful war effort in “Desert Storm” back in 1991, or the
contrasts between the “czar” approach used in the War
failed one in Mogadishu in 1993; we need to give credit
on Drugs and the consolidated approach toward domesto our leaders that they got it right, at least late in 2001,
tic organization in the war against terrorism.
even if there are future unforeseen problems in AfghaniCONCLUSION: HAVE A LITTLE FAITH?
stan in months or years to come. If the reorganization
underlying the Department of Homeland Security
“At the end of the day, do [federal workers]
winds up a failure, at least it won’t be a repetition of
serve the broader interest of homeland
the most comparable recent failure, in the manner of
security where they are? Or is it conceivable
our organization to fight the War on Drugs. That is the
that they should be cross-trained, or should
main lesson: We can’t predict the future, but we can
they be moved into a different role? Who
and truly are learning from the past.
knows? We just don’t know.”
—Brendan Burke is Assistant Professor of Political Science
—Tom Ridge, 10 July 2002

by Ratna Chandrasekhar

If a modern Rip Van Winkle, a person who last visited a
library 20 years ago, should suddenly awaken, he or she
would be in for a shock. Gone are the bulky wooden
structures containing hundreds of drawers, the catalogues which once held a separate card for each book in
the library’s collection. Instead, entering the library,
Rip would see banks of computers, providing access to a
vast quantity of information from books, journals, and
newspapers as well as from libraries, websites and databases around the world. Today, information can be
retrieved far more quickly and efficiently than ever
before. Yet this marvelous technology has brought
with it new problems and challenges for students and
teachers.
As academic librarians, my colleagues and I at the
Maxwell Library are continually at work developing
new instructional strategies to meet the needs of
Bridgewater students and faculty. The internet has
transformed the way research is conducted and made
finding information a great deal easier. But it has created challenges too. The sheer quantity of information
available can be bewildering. It’s common for a student
researcher to enter her topic in a search engine only to
discover, a few seconds later, several thousand ‘hits’ or
matches. How can she limit this topic to make it more
manageable?
Even more critical is the need to evaluate and analyze
information. Decades ago, when the only materials
available were those in the library’s own collection, students could generally assume that the books and articles they found could be trusted. In the new world of
electronic information, however, students need to
become aware of the difference between materials
available through databases that the library subscribes
to and those accessed through search engines on the
internet. Databases provide material that may or may
not have been published in print form and is generally
from valid sources. Often references found on databases
have been peer reviewed and may even be available in
full text. Students using search engines, such as Yahoo,
will find a vast amount of material, but nothing has
been pre-selected and all sources appear equally valid.
Nothing on the screen tells the user whether or not the
information he is reading is accurate, whether the
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author is reliable or prejudiced, a recognized authority
on his subject or a 7th grader. Library users must be
aware of the significant differences between general
internet searches, which provide no easy way to distinguish between the trivial and the significant, and the
databases, which facilitate academic pursuits.
Programs promoting information literacy grew out of
the need to teach students to use electronic sources
effectively, and to evaluate, synthesize, and cite sources
correctly. To achieve this goal, Bridgewater’s academic
librarians have adopted several strategies. Introduction to
Information Resources, a required course which introduces students to the resources and services available at
the Maxwell Library, has an internet component focusing on search engines, web sites, etc. When customized
instruction is requested, librarians work closely with
individual faculty members to design sessions to meet
the needs of students in a particular course. The number of information literacy sessions offered at the
Maxwell Library has increased steadily over the past
few years: during the academic year 2000-2001, 5602
students participated in 246 bibliographic sessions. In
addition, the library offers a number of forums to introduce faculty to the ever-changing world of information.
We encourage collaboration between faculty and
instructional librarians in an effort to improve the
methods for teaching students how to be better
researchers.
Librarians are playing an active role in developing
strategies to promote information literacy. We want to
provide the resources and services necessary to have
BSC students graduate with a solid understanding of
the new information technology.
—Ratna Chandrasekhar began working at
the Maxwell Library in 1980 and was a Senior Librarian
at the time of her death in October, 2002. She served as
Acting Director of the Library from 1991 to 1994.
Ratna understood the enormous potential of computer
technology and was instrumental in creating a classroom
within the library dedicated to teaching the basics of
computer-based research. Well known in the campus
community for her dedication to students and faculty,
Ratna was a beloved and valued member of the library staff.
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